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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the drivers of systemic risk and contagion among European banks. 
First, we use copulas to estimate the systemic risk contribution and systemic risk sensitivity 
based on CDS spreads of European banks from 2005 to 2014. We then run panel regressions 
for our systemic risk measures using idiosyncratic bank characteristics and country control 
variables. Our results comprise highly significant drivers of systemic risk in the European 
banking sector and have important implications for bank regulation. We argue that banks 
which receive state aid and have risky loan portfolios as well as low amounts of available 
liquid funds contribute most to systemic risk whereas relatively poorly equity equipped 
banks, mainly engaged in traditional commercial banking with strong ties to the local private 
sector, headquartered in highly indebted countries are most sensitive to systemic risk. 
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1 Introduction 
Which factors determine the interconnectedness of European banks? In this paper, we 
investigate the drivers of contagion and systemic risk among European banks using a large 
bank dataset with CDS quotes from 2005 to 2014. Banking contagion – a widely debatable 
issue – refers to the transmission of a bank shock to other banks or the financial system. It lies 
at the heart of systemic risk. Contagion is defined as a significant increase in cross-market 
linkages after a shock measured by the degree to which asset prices move together 
(Dornbusch et al., 2000). Early, Bagehot (1873) diagnoses that “in wild periods of alarm, one 
failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the primary 
failure which causes them”. To this end, we propose two novel measures of systemic risk 
through contagion using copula functions and credit default swap (CDS) data to capture the 
systemic impact a single bank default has on the banking system (later systemic risk 
contribution) and vice versa (later systemic risk sensitivity). The topic of our paper is of 
considerable interest to regulators and economists as well: Our results offer new insights into 
the drivers of financial instability and provide implications for the macroprudential regulation 
of banks. 
Financial systems as a whole tend toward instability. This is due to the fragile nature of their 
players, especially banks. Because of their ro le as a financial intermediary (or delegated 
monitor), their opaqueness, their interconnectedness, and the typical characteristics of their 
lenders, banks are particularly prone to affecting other banks with financial distress – or to 
being affected by them. Consequently, the identification of drivers of distress of systemically 
important banks (SIBs) is of vital importance. Recent papers on contagion among banks 
produced substantial findings. Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2015), among 
others, argue that financial contagion can be ambiguous: As long as the magnitude of negative 
shocks affecting financial institutions is sufficiently small, a more densely connected financial 
network (corresponding to a more diversified pattern of interbank liabilities) enhances 
financial stability. In this paper, however, we do not look at the network structure of interbank 
markets itself but focus on systemic default contagion. Existing literature in this field is 
comparably young and leaves questions unanswered: (1) First, it is unclear which channels of 
contagion systemic banking crises have. (2) Second, there is no consensus on how to identify 
systemically important banks. (3) Third, it is unknown how to measure the potential negative 
impact those banks can have on the financial system. We contribute to fill in these research 
gaps by proposing innovative key indicators to measure the extent to which single banks 
impact on the banking system and vice versa, as well as controlling for determinants of those  
contagious procedures. This is carried out as follows:  
3 
Section 2 offers a review of related literature on contagion and systemic risk (in Europe) as 
our background and starting point. The subsequent section presents our copula-based model 
to estimate systemic risk using CDS quotes. The bank selection and data collection are 
explained in Section 4. In the fifth section, we derive key determinants of contagion in the 
banking sector, while Section 6 concludes our findings. 
 
2 Related Literature 
In this section, we briefly discuss the related theoretical and empirical literature on using 
copulas for estimating contagion and identifying drivers of systemic risk in the European 
banking sector. Dornbusch et al. (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2015), among others, argue that 
the ways in which bank shocks are transmitted do seem to differ, and these differences are 
important. We follow their line of thought and propose two novel measures of systemic risk.  
The first step for the identification of drivers of systemic risk is the assessment of systemic 
risk levels. The number of measures for systemic risk is growing fast1. The existing literature 
can be divided into the (1) systemic risk sensitivity- and the (2) systemic risk contribution  
stream. Approaches for (1) systemic risk sensitivity (Acharya et al., 2011; Brownlees and 
Engle, 2012; Jobst and Gray, 2013; Weiß et al., 2014) try to determine systemic importance 
by measuring the extent to what a single institution is affected in case of a systemic  
macroeconomic event (e.g. interest rate change); see Figure 1. The overall functioning of the 
(financial) system and individual institutional resilience is in the focus of this first approach2. 
Conversely designed measures dealing with the (2) systemic risk contribution (Chan-Lau, 
2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Billio et al., 2012; León and Murcia, 2013) try to 
determine systemic importance by measuring the impact of a negative shock in a single 
institution on systemic risk3. These measures assess how one institution affects a group of 
others; see Figure 1. According to this understanding, it is of special interest to avoid and 
mitigate contagion effects.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
  
                                                 
1
  Bisias et al. (2012) provide a survey of systemic risk measures. Dornbusch et al. (2000) d ivide the empirical 
measures of contagion into the following categories: correlation of asset prices, conditional probabilit ies, and 
volatility changes.  
2
  Examples are Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), SRISK (the capital that a firm is expected to need in 
financial crises), Lower Tail Dependence (LTD) and Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA).  
3
  Examples are ΔCoVar, Co-Risk, and Granger Causality.  
4 
Copulas (see definition in Section 3.1 ahead) have been applied in different ways in the 
context of systemic risk. Engle et al. (2014), for instance, use a particular copula (Student t) to 
represent the dependence across innovations of errors in a GARCH model related to firms’ 
and regions’ stock returns. CDS are increasingly used as a proxy for credit risk. Oh and Patton 
(2013) propose the use of multivariate copulas to model the relationship among CDS spreads 
and to estimate the CDS issuers’ joint probability of distress which is presented as proxy for 
systemic risk. Martínez-Jaramillo et al. (2010) join individual banks’ loss distributions by 
means of copulas and generate a univariate loss distribution for the whole financial system. 
Based on this distribution, the authors use risk measures, such as the Conditional Value-at-
Risk (CoVaR or Expected Shortfall), to evaluate the system’s risk. Philippas and Siriopoulos 
(2013) study the contagion among six European bond markets by applying bivariate (Student 
t) copulas with time-varying parameters to model the association across bond returns. Buhler 
and Prokopczuk (2010) use a particular copula (“BB7”) to model the dependence across stock 
returns in several industry sectors and in the banking sector. 
We use CDS prices rather than stock returns as a measure of contagion for one major reason: 
Unlike CDS, stock prices capture more than the default probability but current and future 
levels of economic activity (Grossman and Shiller, 1981). Market participants’ perception of 
the value of the assets of a certain issuer may be insightful, but we believe that the pure 
assessment of default risks and how they ultimately spread gives a clearer idea of contagion 
and systemic risk among financial institutions.  
To sum up, the literature related to the application of copulas in systemic risk investigates the 
relationship among financial variables (e.g. stock returns and CDS spreads). At this point our 
study innovates by considering the financial institutions’ probabilities of default as the 
variable of interest and by exploring a novel link between this variable and copula functions. 
Whereas previous works assume the copula to be used (e.g. Engle et al., 2014; Philippas and 
Siriopoulos, 2013; Buhler and Prokopczuk, 2010), we estimate the best-fit copula for our data 
using goodness-of- fit tests4. This represents an advantage of our study since we select, among 
some theoretically justified candidates, the empirically most suitable copula for each specific 
data analysed whilst copulas previously assumed, as done in other studies, might not represent 
the data considered. 
The second step for the identification of drivers of systemic risk  and contagion is to run panel 
regression analyses on our systemic risk results with different potential factors from the micro 
or macro level that may affect systemic risk. Previous papers came to following findings:  
                                                 
4
  Genest et al. (2009) provide a detailed introduction into goodness-of-fit tests. 
5 
Starting with the (1) risk sensitivity approach Engle et al. (2014) find that banks account for 
approximately 80% of the systemic risk in Europe, with UK and French institutions bearing 
the highest levels of systemic risk. Acharya and Steffen (2014) come to the conclusion that 
banks’ sovereign debt holdings are major contributors to systemic risk. Vallascas and Keasey 
(2012) spot several key drivers of systemic risk of European banks like high leverage, low 
liquidity, size and high non- interest income. Varotto and Zhao (2014) confirm the positive 
impact of size and leverage on systemic risk for a set of European banks. Black et al. (2013) 
confirm that bank size has a positive impact on the increase of systemic risk. Interestingly 
they also find that European banks with a more traditional lending business and more liquid 
assets are less likely to increase systemic risk. Lastly, they find that bank profitability has no 
impact on systemic risk and the market to book ratio has an unstable influence on banks’ 
systemic risk in Europe.  
Based on the (2) systemic risk contribution approach several findings have been made: Bori 
et al. (2012) detect market based variables as strong predictors for systemic risk in Europe. 
Their results show that institutional factors like size and leverage contribute significantly to 
banks’ systemic risk. Also the banking system concentration increases systemic risk. Hautsch 
et al. (2014) find that unlike leverage and funding risk (measured by maturity mismatch), size 
is not a dominant factor among European banks.  
The empirical literature on systemic risks of European banks, however, still lacks a 
comparative study that examines the drivers of systemic risk of banks derived from CDS 
quotes (default contagion). In addition to closing this research gap we combine this with a 
broad set of bank characteristics and country policy variables. 
 
3 Measuring systemic risk and contagion  
To measure systemic risk and contagion in the European banking system, we propose new 
risk measures, systemic risk sensitivity and systemic risk contribution controlling for the two 
channels of contagion illustrated in Figure 1 by combining the interpretation of default in 
structural credit risk models and copula functions. The first measure captures the potential 
impact of a banking system’s distress on each financial institution and the second measure 
captures the potential impact of an institution’s failure on the banking system. To analyse the 
determinants of systemic risk, we make use of the approaches elaborated by Acharya and 
Steffen (2014), and Weiß et al. (2014). 
6 
3.1 Copulas 
Copulas are functions that link univariate distributions to the multivariate distribution of the 
related variables: 
                           [1] 
where C is the copula, H(.) is a bivariate function, and FX(.) and FY(.) are cumulative 
distribution functions of X and Y, respectively. 
Due to the “Probability Integral Transformation”, FX(x) and FY(y) represent variables 
uniformly distributed in (0,1). That is, whenever a random variable is evaluated in its own 
continuous cumulative distribution function (F), all the resultant values are equally spread in 
the interval between 0 and 1 (Casella and Berger, 2008).   
So, the copula C links uniform variables, FX(x) and FY(y), to a multivariate distribution that, in 
this example, gives Pr[X<x,Y<y], the probability that X and Y are simultaneously below x and 
y. Such uniform variables correspond to the quantiles of the distributions FX and FY 
respectively evaluated at x and y. Thus the dependence measured by copulas is valid for any 
type of distribution.5  
The likelihood of a variable being below a specific value conditional on another variable 
being below another particular point can also be calculated by means of copulas. The 
probability that X is smaller than x conditional on Y  being smaller than y can be found by the 
expression:  
              
           
       
 
             
     
    [2] 
where the notation follows [1] and the symbol “|” stands for “conditional on”.  
 
3.2 A Copula approach to estimate conditional default  
3.2.1 Structural interpretation of probability of default 
In this paper, the use of copulas to estimate joint defaults relies on a basic assumption of 
structural credit risk models (initially proposed by Merton, 1974) according to which an 
obligor defaults when a latent variable (typically interpreted as the log-return of an obligor’s 
assets) falls below a threshold (the amount needed to pay the outstanding debt). So, if the 
latent variable is denoted as Y and its cut off value (below which default happens) is yc, the 
highlighted area in Figure 2 represents the probability of default (PD). 
                                                 
5
  For an introduction and more details about copulas, see Nelsen (2006) and Joe (2014). 
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[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
To measure contagion we start with the estimation of the probability that two obligors i and j 
default at the same time: In credit risk models largely employed by industry nowadays6, this 
likelihood is estimated in line with factor models which assume that the correlation among 
defaults is driven by the debtors’ latent variables (e.g., Bluhm et al., 2010; Crouhy et al., 
2014). These models have the limitations of assuming normally-distributed variables (which 
in general does not correspond to the reality in financial markets) and using the linear 
correlation (which is not an adequate measure of dependence when variables diverge from the 
normality – see Embrechts et al., 2002). 
Given that the probability of default can be associated to a distribution function (of latent 
variables), copulas can be used in this context to model the dependence across the latent 
variables (regardless of their distribution shape) so that the distributions FX and FY in 
expression [2] result in probabilities of default. 
3.2.2 The model 
Following structural credit risk models, it can be assumed that the observed PD of a particular 
financial institution, bank, is the probability that an underlying variable (e.g. its liquid assets) 
will fall below a specific level (equivalent to the e.g. short-term liabilities). It is not possible 
to distinguish which proportion of this potential failure is resultant from the default of other 
financial institutions (i.e. a systemic risk event/systemic shock) and which part is caused by 
the respective bank’s individual characteristics.  
To this end we calculate the probability of default of an individual bank at time t conditional 
on a systemic crisis in the banking system at time t: This can be achieved by estimating the 
joint probability of default (joint PD) of the bank and the banking system. This joint PD can 
be estimated via copulas. Based on [2] the probability of an individual bank default at time t 
(PDbank,t, the probability of its latent variable Ybank,t falling below a threshold ybank,c,t at time t) 
conditional on a systemic crisis (PDsystem,t, similarly, the probability of Ysystem,t < ysystem,c,t at 
time t) is given by the copula that links those two variables evaluated at the cut off points 
divided by the probability of a systemic crisis: 
                                            
                                                 
6
  Popular examples of quantitative credit analysis are Moody’s KMV (KMV, 1987) model and JP Morgan’s 
CreditMetrics (JP Morgan, 1997). 
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Since, for each bank,                  , the expression above becomes:  
                                                             
 
                                            
              
  
 
                      
          
 . 
Thus, we can write: 
                
                        
          
 .    [3] 
This means that the probability of default of bank at time t conditional on the failure of the 
banking system (PDbank|system,t) will be given by the copula that associates the probability of 
default of the bank at time t with the probability of a banking system default at time t divided 
by the banking system’s probability of default at time t. This method has the advantage of 
capturing possible higher impact of the banking system’s failure on a bank when their 
probability of default is higher (e.g. in downturns). Alternatively, lagged data concerning the 
banking system (PDsystem,t-1) that might trigger the default of other institutions can be used. 
According to [3], if PDbank,t increases and PDsystem,t remains constant, PDbank|system,t either 
increases (likely) or does not change (as the copula C may remain constant due to small 
increments in PDbank,t). On the other hand, if PDsystem,t increases and PDbank,t remains constant, 
the change in PDbank|system,t calculated in [3] depends on how much C(PDbank,t ,PDsystem,t) and 
PDsystem,t change. The same applies to situations where both PDbank,t and PDsystem,t increase. 
It is interesting to note that the copula C refers to the dependence across the latent variables 
(Y) but data on probability of default (PD) can be used to estimate that copula. Since copulas 
are invariant under strictly increasing transformations of variables (Embrechts et al., 2002) 
and PD is a strictly increasing transformation of the latent variables7, i.e. PD = F(y), the 
copula between PDs is identical to the copula between Ys. Thus, to find this copula the 
observable PD information has to be used. Once the copula that links PDs is identified it can 
be used to connect the underlying variables. A numerical example (Table 1) elucidates the 
steps to estimate the bank’s probability of default depending on the failure of the banking 
system. Table 1 (partially) displays some hypothetical values of PDs (in decimal format) for a 
                                                 
7
  That is, the smallest PD is associated to the smallest y and so on until the highest PD which is associated to 
the highest y.  
9 
bank and for the banking system, over a period of T months (naturally, other periods, such as 
weeks, could be used). 
By using [3], we can estimate the conditional PD involving the bank and the banking system 
for each period. At this point, we will have a bank’s probability of default conditional on the 
systemic event in the banking sector (PDbank|system) for each month so that we will have a set of 
T values (since the dataset covers T months) – see Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Hence, in sum, to estimate bank’s probability of default conditional on the failure of the 
banking system we follow a four-step procedure: First, we select candidate copulas to 
represent the dependence between PDbank and PDsystem (note that lagged observations of the 
conditioning banking system can be used). We then use a Maximum Likelihood (ML) method 
to estimate the best- fit parameter (θ) for each candidate copula (e.g., Joe, 2014). After that, 
considering the parameters found in the previous step, we apply a goodness-of-fit test to 
decide which copula is the best representation of the dependence structure of the observed 
data (Berg, 2009; Genest et al., 2009).   Finally, after finding the best- fit copula family (e.g. 
Gaussian or Gumbel) and its respective parameter (θ), we use expression [3] to calculate 
PDbank|system,t  for each period t (month t in the example shown in Table 1). This will yield a 
conditional probability of default for each period.  
Similar to [3], the probability of a systemic crisis in the banking system at time t conditional 
on the default of a particular bank at time t (PDsystem|bank,t) is given by: 
                
                        
        
 .                            [4] 
 
4 Data 
In this section we explain the sample selection and data collection.  
4.1 Sample selection and CDS data 
We start by selecting the ten year period 2005-2014 for our analysis. It is the largest available 
sample of CDS prices of European financial institutions and covers tranquil times 2005-2007 
as well as periods with turmoil during the “great financial crisis” (GFC) and with turbulent 
developments among the European (sovereign debt) market 2008-2014 (Black et al., 2013). 
10 
Subsequently, to have a testable sample of systemically relevant banks in the European 
Union, we choose the 2014 European Banking Authority (EBA) EU-wide stress test sample 
of banks as it includes quantitative and qualitative selection criteria. The bank selection is 
based on asset value, importance for the economy of the country, scale of cross-border 
activities, whether the bank requested/received public financial assistance8. This initial EBA-
sample contains 124 bank holdings from 22 countries9. We start collecting data for CDS of 
senior unsecured debt with a maturity of five years of the banks from the EBA-sample from 
S&P Capital IQ. However, the number of European banks with publicly traded CDS is 47 for 
the period 2004-2014, leading to 373 observed banks over 11 years. Due to lacking or 
inconsistent accounting and missing country data, after hand collecting missing values, we 
further have to exclude a number of banks,10 so that we finally produce a full (unbalanced 
panel) sample composed of 260 observations of 36 European financial institutions from 2005 
to 201311. The banks in our final sample are listed in Appendix Table 1. We use daily data to 
estimate the probability of default (PD) of those institutions (using expression [5] below) 
from 15 Aug 2005 to 31 Dec 201412.  
Assume a one-period CDS contract with the CDS holder exposed to an expected loss,   , 
equal to:             ,where    is the default probability, and    is the expected 
recovery rate at default.13 Neglecting market frictions, fair pricing arguments and risk 
neutrality imply that the credit default swap (CDS) spread, s, or “default insurance” premium, 
should be equal to the present value of the expected loss (Chan-Lau, 2006): 
  
        
    
  
                                                 
8
  The newer, but slightly shorter European Central Bank (ECB) list of “significant” supervised entities from 
September 2014 equals the EBA 2014 list with a few exceptions. We do not use this list since it does not 
include UK banks.  
9
  Namely Australia, Belg ium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom. 
10
  We manually check missing accounting values, finding most of them. In some cases, however, we do not 
find the necessary data, which may b ias our results since balance sheet composition may affect the bank 
opacity (Flannery et al., 2013). In a recent paper on bank opaqueness, Mendonça et al. (2013) find that a 
decrease in bank opaqueness fosters an environment favourable to the development of a sound banking 
system and the avoidance of financial crises. 
11
  The year 2004 has to be excluded due to non-availability of the overnight index swap rate. 
12
  Although the informat ion on CDS spread is available from 01 Jan 2004, the data on the risk-free rate used to 
estimate probability of default (PD) are only available from 15 Aug 2005. Thus, our sample period to 
estimate PD starts on 15 Aug 2005 and, as we are using daily data, there are 100 observations in 2005, which  
are enough for the estimation of the dependence structures (copulas) in that year.  
13
  The recovery rate and default probability are assumed to be independent. 
11 
where s is the CDS spread, rf is the risk-free rate, and RR is the recovery rate. The probability 
of default (PD) of the financial institutions considered is estimated according to the following 
formula mentioned in Chan-Lau (2013, p. 64):14 
   
       
    
      [5] 
Note that RR is restricted to RR  -s(1+rf)+1 given that 0 ≤ PD ≤ 1. Empirical papers find 
historical recovery ratios for financial institutions of usually 40-60% (Acharya et al., 2004; 
Conrad et al., 2012; Black et al., 2013). For our baseline regressions we use a recovery rate of 
50% (RR=0.5) as Jankowitsch et al. (2014) find a mean recovery rate of 0.493 for US banks 
and Sarbu et al. (2013) find a mean recovery rate of 0.495 for senior unsecured debt of 
financial institutions in a US/EU sample.15  
In line with a current tendency in the financial industry (Brousseau et al., 2012), the overnight 
index swap (OIS) rate is used as the risk-free rate. Contrary to London Interbank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR) swap rates, the traditional benchmark in the past, the credit risk of counterparties in 
OIS does not affect rates as much and it therefore can be seen as a default- free rate (Hull and 
White, 2013). Moreover, recent illicit practices by banks to influence the LIBOR rate have 
contributed to the adoption of an alternative proxy for the risk-free rate (Hou and Skeie, 
2014).  
The CDS premium of the Europe Banks Sector 5 Year CDS Index (EUBANCD) is used as a 
proxy for the calculations of the probability of a systemic shock in the European banking 
system. This CDS index represents a price basket of all bank CDS from Europe and has more 
than 50 constituents. The other variables were the same used in the calculation of the 
institutions’ PDs.  
4.2 Copula Selection 
We consider four candidate copula families to model the connection between the probabilities 
of default of the financial institutions analysed: Clayton (lower-tail dependence), Gaussian 
(symmetric association without tail dependence), Gumbel (upper-tail dependence) and 
Student t (symmetric association with tail dependence). These families cover the main 
combinations of features (in terms of symmetry and tail dependence) necessary to capture the 
possible links between the variables studied and are most commonly used copulas in finance 
                                                 
14
  For earlier studies on CDSs’ implied default probability, see e.g. Duffie (1999) as well as Hull and White 
(2000). 
15
  To show that most of our results do not depend on the recovery rate we chose, we provide results for RRs of 
0.10, 0.40, 0.60 and 0.90 as a robustness check. 
12 
(Czado, 2010). As for goodness-of- fit tests we use the most robust methods according to Berg 
(2009) and Genest et al. (2009).  
The number of best- fit copulas for each of the aforementioned families regarding the 
association across each financial institution and the banking system is shown in Table 2.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
In the case of 30 institutions the Clayton-Copula (stronger dependence at lower values of PD, 
as in the example of HSBC, Figure 3) fits best to explain the default dependence of an 
institution and the banking system. A relatively high contagion can therefore be expected in 
relatively stable market periods for those 30 institutions. This result shows that 
interconnectedness decreases for many European banks in crisis periods, possibly driven by 
decreasing interbank trading. The Gaussian copula (no dependence in extreme ranges) does 
not express the dependence regarding any bank in the sample. This result is not really 
surprising since a symmetrical dependence without strong association in extreme ranges 
seems to be quite rare. In the case of four of the 36 financial institutions in our sample the 
Gumbel copula represents the dependence between the probability of default and the 
probability of distress in the whole system. This indicates right-tail dependence and means 
that relatively large values of the PDs are more connected than intermediate values of PD. An 
example is the dependency of the default probability of the Bayerische Landesbank and the 
European banking system shown in Figure 3. This Gumbel copula means, in other words, that 
some institutions can get especially risky in times of crises since they amplify the undesired 
effects of the crisis and the contagion. The dependence regarding 13 of the institutions 
considered is represented by the Student t copula which means that extreme values of PD 
(both low and high) are more connected than intermediate values of PDs are, as in the 
example of Credit Agricole shown in Figure 3 
So, as expected, all the institutions considered present tail dependence and 17 of them (those 
institutions whose dependence with the bank system is characterized by the Gumbel or the 
Student t copulas) have stronger connection with the system’s distress when their probabilities 
of default are at high levels. Conversely, the other 30 institutions (whose association with the 
whole system is expressed by the Clayton copula) have stronger association with the bank 
system when their default probabilities are low.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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4.3 Bank characteristics and country controls 
The second purpose of our study is to identify determinants of contagion among banks in 
Europe. We investigate the extent to which, ultimately, panel regressions of joint default 
probabilites could explain why some banks have a higher influence on systemic risk than 
others.16 With this objective in mind, we collect a dataset on idiosyncratic bank characteristics 
as well as information concerning countries’ regulatory environments and macroeconomic 
conditions. The data on bank characteristics are obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope. 
The full variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 2. Where available, we fill data 
gaps manually with data from banks’ websites.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
To control for the impact of different macroeconomic conditions and regulations among the 
European Union jurisdictions, we include another three variables. Differences in (capital) 
regulation are of special interest, because stricter regulations and  powerful supervisors could 
limit systemic risks. The data we use are provided by the World Bank, Eurostat or European 
Commission databases (Appendix Table 2 provides detailed definitions and data sources). 
Table 3 also reports the expected influence of the explanatory variables we use in the panel 
regressions. 
 
5 Results  
In this section, we first present the results for the estimates of banks’ systemic risk and then 
turn to the panel regressions of the dependent systemic risk measure for our sample of 260 
bank observations during the period 2005 - 2013. 
5.1 Systemic risk of European banks 
To analyse the determinants of contagion among European banks, we first compute the 
conditional probabilities PDbank|system and PDsystem|bank for all banks in the sample following 
expressions [3] and [4], respectively. The results show that, on average, the highest sensitivity 
of banks to a potential financial crisis (PDbank|system) is observed in 2006 (see Table 4) whilst 
                                                 
16
  Interestingly and in contrast to most of the literature, Dungey et al. (2012) find cases where firm 
characteristics make little  difference to the systemic risks of banks. 
14 
the highest risk of collapse of the whole bank system as a consequence of the failure of a 
single institution (PDsystem|bank) happens in 2008 (see Table 5). The two measures present 
different behaviour; PDbank|system (our measure of systemic risk sensitivity) increases from 
2005 to 2006 and then falls reaching its minimum level in 2009. After that, it oscillates until 
the end of our sample period in 2014. On the other hand, PDsystem|bank (i.e. individual’s banks’ 
contributions to the systemic risk) decreases between 2005 and 2006. Then it rises until 2008 
when its peak is observed. Next, it falls until 2014.  
These results indicate that the systemic risk has continuously decreased since the GFC but the 
sensitivity of individual financial institutions to systemic shocks has oscillated since 2009 
with an upward trend in the recent years. This means that, although the probability of a 
generalised financial crisis resulting from the failure of a single bank has reduced, if such 
crisis occurs the potential impact on each bank will be, on average, higher than it would have 
been around five years ago.    
However, it is interesting to note that, although the two measures, PDbank|system and PDsystem|bank 
, present distinct patterns the magnitude of the latter is higher than the magnitude of the 
former in all years covered in our sample.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5.2 Panel regressions of systemic risk 
Turning to our main research question, we try to identify the drivers of contagion among our 
sample of European banks. To this end, we estimate several linear panel regression models 
using the annual mean conditional probabilities PDbank|system  or PDsystem|bank as the dependent 
variables as well as nine bank specific and three country/policy specific explanatory variables: 
Table 6 presents the results of our main regressions for the 260 bank observations, whilst 
results of numerous robustness checks follow in Section 5.3 and panel data tests/diagnostics 
are reported in the appendix. 
The random effects estimator is used in order to account for time-variant bank-specific data 
and guarantees consistent coefficient estimates in the baseline regressions. Further details of 
the test diagnostics (random effects, (time) fixed effects, cross sectional dependence) are 
reported in Appendix Table 3. The Hausmann (1978) specification test indicates that the 
random effects estimator is only consistent for one regression (assumption of RR=50%) in 
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Table 6, and thus we use the fixed effects estimator model. The rationale behind the fixed 
effects model is that, unlike the random effects model, variation across banks is assumed to be 
neither random nor uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the 
model. All estimation results of the linear fixed effects panel regression models, are based on 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors because unreported results confirm the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and cross sectional dependence in our regressions. We 
control for time fixed effects by splitting the sample in a stable (2005-2007) and crisis (2008-
2013) period sample. Appendix Table 4 provides correlations of the variables used in the 
regressions. 
The panel regression models in Table 6 indicate that numerous explanatory variables have a 
significant effect on bank contagion. Most resulting coefficients, however, match closely with 
our estimated direction of the influence, which is derived from theory and existing empirical 
literature: To start with NON_PERF – a proxy for a bank’s loan portfolio quality – is 
significant for systemic risk contribution during the tranquil period. Our results indicate that a 
high share of loan loss provisions to the total book value of loans increases systemic risk 
contribution during non-crisis times. The systemic risk sensitivity, however, is not affected by 
loan loss provisions of banks. 
A further variable we use is the regulatory measure TIER1-ratio (or Basel core capital ratio), 
which is the ratio of core equity capital to total risk-weighted assets, measuring the capacity 
of loss absorption. According to regulators, a high TIER1-ratio would indicate that the bank is 
in a solid state and more resilient to external shock. In this case, we would expect it to have a 
negative impact on a bank’s systemic sensitivity. Our empirical results confirm this for the 
systemic risk sensitivity during the crisis period. During the tranquil period, however, the 
coefficient for TIER1 indicates the contrary: Systemic risk contribution is driven by TIER1. 
Equally from a theoretical perspective Perotti et al. (2011) find that banks that are forced to 
have a higher regulatory coverage ratio, may be incentivised to take even more risk because 
they do not internalise the negative realisations of tail risk projects.  
As a proxy for the banks’ liability portfolio and business type, we utilise DEPOSIT, i.e. the 
ratio of total deposits to total liabilities. Traditional commercial banks with a focus on non-
securitised savings and loan business usually have high deposit ratios. In particular, banks 
with high deposit ratios are financed less via securities or by the capital market in general. 
Therefore, they are less connected to other banks or other institutional investors. For these 
reasons, we expect DEPOSIT to have a negative influence on banks’ systemic risk. We cannot 
confirm this but find a positive correlation of systemic risk sensitivity and the deposit ratio 
during the crisis period. A high LEVERAGE – the ratio of debt to equity – means that a bank 
is financed to a large extent by creditors, exposing them to high financial leverage risk that is 
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due to the actions of private depositors in particular. Our results, however, show insignificant 
coefficients. 
Another bank-specific variable we consider is LIQUIDITY (the ratio of cash and tradable 
securities to total deposits): A large portion of cash and security reserves is probably 
advantageous at times of negative shocks in the financial system, when interbank markets 
easily dry out and liquidity becomes scarce (e.g. Brunnermeier, 2009). The coefficient 
indicates that LIQUIDITY has a two-sided impact on systemic risk during the crisis period; an 
outcome that literature and theory do support, as  banks with high reserves of liquid assets 
(e.g. stocks held for trading and other tradable securities) are more vulnerable to market 
reactions, but contribute less to systemic risk since solvent banks are able to endow sufficient 
capital and current asset reserves, i.e. cushions against losses or liquidity shortages.  
Next, we control for the influence of banks’ profitability on systemic risk by employing the 
capital-oriented return on invested capital (ROIC). In principle, as Weiß et al. (2014) argue, 
ROIC could be coincident with stability or risk: High values of ROIC could shield from the 
risk of defaulting, so that those banks could be a pillar of stability. Higher p rofitability, on the 
other hand, could also be the result of extended yet successful engagement in risky 
lending/non- lending activities, which may suddenly cause or contribute to the bank’s as well 
as general systemic instability. This may explain the weak positive effect on systemic risk 
sensitivity we find. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Our country controls are insightful too: To control for the country’s indebtedness where the 
bank is headquartered we use the external debt ratio (DEBT), which is the government gross 
debt in relation to the respective gross domestic product (GDP). Policy makers in countries 
with high levels of debt have lower chances to bailout banks since financial resources are 
scarce. We therefore expect high government debt levels to positively influence domestic 
banks’ systemic risk sensitivity. Our empirical results confirm this for the case of the systemic 
risk sensitivity: The fragility of banks due to systemic events (systemic risk sensitivity) is 
driven by government indebtedness. Banks in highly indebted countries, however, spread less 
risk into the banking system, as the negative correlation of DEBT and systemic risk 
contribution indicates. To additionally examine to what extent the inter-relations between a 
country and its domestic banking sector drive systemic risk, we use the claims of the 
institutions on their respective central government (as a percentage of GDP) as another 
variable (CLAIM). If the domestic banking sector holds a relatively high share of its 
17 
government’s public debt, this should increase the systemic risk of banks in the financial 
system. We find mixed results. Another variable to consider is CREDIT - the amount of 
financial resources banks provide to the private sector of their country as a percentage of 
GDP. If the private sector borrows financial resources on a large scale, banks are probably 
more systemically relevant since they would call in their loans in times of distress. Our results 
confirm that assumption for the case of systemic sensitivity. It shows that banks are more 
likely to be negatively affected by macro shocks when there is a high dependency on the 
economic well-being of the private sector of a country. Finally, to capture the influence of 
governmental aid for certain banks on systemic risk, we control for state aid interventions. 
Interventions only started in 2008. We find that state aid makes banks more resilient towards 
systemic shocks. The observable decrease of the systemic risk sensitivity due to government 
interventions is plausible, and intended by regulators. An increase in the systemic risk 
contribution, as the results show, may be one unintended side effect of the intervention. It can 
be explained with an increased confidence of market participants that an institution is TBTF.  
For each form of systemic risk, we only report two baseline regressions. We estimate further 
specifications of the panel regressions using different sets of bank-/country-specific variables. 
Although we do not tabulate all results from these additional regressions, we comment on 
them in the following Section 5.3, where we analyse the robustness of our results.  
5.3 Robustness checks 
We perform numerous checks to examine the robustness of our results to alternate model 
specifications and different data. To show that our results will not change using a different 
recovery ratio, Appendix Tables 5 and 6 provide robustness check results for the panel 
regressions (fixed effects) of banks' systemic risk using a recovery ratio assumption of 10% 
and 90%, respectively. The significant coefficients of the regression model on banks’ 
systemic risk sensitivity do not change their direction (positive/negative) of how they affect 
systemic risk. Only for a recovery rate of 90% results indicate that CLAIM and LIQUIDITY 
become insignificant. However, for a recovery rate of 90% NON_PERF and LEVERAGE 
have a significant risk decreasing influence. We can further prove that the results of the 
baseline regressions depend neither on insignificant explanatory variables nor on the choice of 
a fixed or random panel regression model. Additionally, we estimate alternative specifications 
of the panel regressions using different sets of explanatory variables. We find that the results 
from our baseline regressions are not substantially affected. To conclude, our robustness 
checks generally suggest that the findings obtained in the baseline specifications are robust.  
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6 Conclusion 
In this study, we analyse the major drivers of contagion among banks in Europe. In particular, 
we explain why some banks are expected to contribute more to systemic events and are more 
likely to be negatively affected by systemic events in the European financial system than 
others. In our panel regressions, we find empirical evidence supporting existing literature on 
bank contagion, identifying the asset/liability structure, loan portfolio risk, and a few 
macroeconomic conditions as drivers of contagion. We also find that simpler approaches in 
measuring systemic risk – as proposed by Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) – would not be 
suitable because the systemic risk sensitivity and the contribution of a bank to systemic risk 
are driven by different factors.  
Comparably to Acemoglu et al. (2015) our results highlight that the same factors that 
contribute to resilience under certain conditions (e.g. liquid assets that decrease systemic risk 
contribution during the crisis) may function as significant sources of systemic risk under 
others. To point out the major differences between determinants of systemic risk sensitivity 
and systemic risk contribution, we find that relatively poorly equity equipped banks, mainly 
engaged in traditional commercial banking, headquartered in highly indebted countries with 
strong ties to the local private sector have the highest systemic risk sensitivity. We 
additionally show that systemic risk contribution stems from those well equity equipped 
banks with risky loan portfolios that have low amounts of available liquid funds, receive state 
aid and are located in countries with lower government debts. 
Regulators have to consider a broad variety of indicators for systemic importance. Banks’ size 
and liquidity as well as sound economic conditions in the country where they are located in 
exhibit a reducing effect on systemic risk. Although we propose different measures for 
systemic risk, we empirically confirm the urgency of recent regulatory approaches to identify 
channels of contagion among banks in Europe by using a broad set of financial indicators 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013). Macroprudential regulation is essential to 
prevent systemic risk crises in the banking system.  
Some limitations of our research, however, remain: Firstly, although our suggested copula-
based model can be easily applied by practitioners, it is limited to the bivariate case, that is, 
each financial institution is only evaluated with respect to the whole banking system. Hence, 
it will be important to extend this analysis to the multivariate case where the connections 
among several individual institutions are simultaneously modelled. Moreover the use of CDS 
data excludes a high number of (admittedly “smaller”) institutions without publicly listed 
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CDS securities.17 The second shortfall is that we do not assess the contagious impact of other 
financial institutions, such as insurers, investment funds and players from the growing shadow 
banking system. Finally, to confirm our findings in the long run, future research could try to 
make use of financial and country data over longer periods.  
  
                                                 
17
  The most useful measures of systemic risk may be ones that have yet to be tried because they require 
proprietary data only regulators can obtain (Bisias et al., 2012). 
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Table 1: Illustrative data on series of copulas representing a bank’s probability of default 
conditional on the banking system’s default 
This table provides hypothetical data concerning the default probability of a bank at time t (PDbank,t) and the 
probability of d istress in the banking system at time t (PDsystem,t).  
Month PDbank PDsystem 
Conditional PD 
In copula notation Using data from PDbank and PDsystem 
1 0.02 0.03 C(PDbank,1, PDsystem,1)/ 
PDsystem,1 
[C(0.02,0.03)]/0.03 
2 0.02 0.04 C(PDbank,2 ,PDsystem,2) )/ 
PDsystem,2 
[C(0.02,0.04)]/0.04 
3 0.03 0.07 C(PDbank,3,PDsystem,3) )/ 
PDsystem,3 
[C(0.03,0.07)]/0.07 
… … … … … 
T 0.03 0.06 C(PDbank,T,PDsystem,T) )/ 
PDsystem,T 
[C(0.03,0.06)]/0.06 
 
 
Table 2: Number of best-fit copulas (between financial institutions’ PD and banking system’s 
PD) 
This table provides the number of cases where the dependence between banks’ PD and the banking system’s PD 
is represented by each of the copulas tested. 
Copula  Number of banks 
Clayton 30 
Gaussian 0 
Gumbel 4 
Student t 13 
Total 47 
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Table 3. Summary statistics for bank characteristics and country controls 
This table provides descriptive statistics for bank-specific financial data (from balance sheets and profit and 
loss statements) and country controls used in the panel regressions. Bank-specific data are taken from the 
databases Thomson Worldscope and Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream. Country controls come from the 
World Bank  or the Eurostat database. Further variable definit ions and data sources are provided in  Appendix 
Table 2.  
Explanatory variab le 
Expected 
influence 
Symbol Obs Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max 
Non-performing loan ratio + NON_PERF 260 0.94% 0.68% 0.95% -0.15% 7.63% 
Tier 1 ratio +/- TIER1  260 10.18% 10.00% 3.15% -6.70% 21.40% 
Deposit ratio +/- DEPOSIT 260 40.41% 40.45% 12.49% 6.30% 67.90% 
Leverage ratio + LEVERAGE 260 8.16 7.15 12.87 -93.6 99.7 
Liquidity ratio - LIQUIDITY 260 108.63% 70.65% 86.38% 20.50% 712.80% 
Return on invested capital +/- ROIC 260 1.58% 2.10% 3.15% -29.40% 11.60% 
Government debt + DEBT 260 81.22% 81.60% 34.05% 20.60% 174.90% 
Bank claims to government + CLAIM 260 18.08% 17.90% 12.06% -12.40% 44.80% 
Bank credits to private + CREDIT 260 135.26% 120.00% 44.59% 0.00% 224.00% 
State aid dummy +/- AID 260 7.70% 0.00% 26.70% 0.00% 100% 
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Table 4: Summary statistics for systemic risk sensitivity: PDbank|system 
This table provides average systemic risk sensitivity of the sample analysed in each year considered and other related statis tics for the whole period. Recovery rate refers to the values used 
to estimate PD according to [5]. The table presents the information for each year in our sample period and the results aggreg ated for the whole period. 
Recovery 
rate 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2005 - 2014 
Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max 
10% 0.735 0.754 0.737 0.624 0.584 0.627 0.602 0.589 0.620 0.627 0.637 0.638 0.253 0.088 1.000 
40% 0.737 0.756 0.740 0.628 0.588 0.631 0.606 0.594 0.626 0.634 0.641 0.643 0.250 0.106 1.000 
50% 0.738 0.757 0.741 0.630 0.590 0.634 0.609 0.597 0.629 0.638 0.644 0.647 0.248 0.115 1.000 
60% 0.740 0.759 0.742 0.632 0.593 0.636 0.612 0.600 0.633 0.643 0.647 0.648 0.246 0.127 1.000 
90% 0.749 0.769 0.754 0.652 0.617 0.662 0.639 0.633 0.668 0.643 0.668 0.667 0.235 0.203 1.000 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics for systemic risk contribution: PDsystem|bank 
This table provides average systemic risk sensitivity of the sample analysed in each year considered and other related statistics for the whole period. Recovery rate refers to the values used 
to estimate PD according to [5]. The table presents the information for each year in our sample period and the results aggreg ated for the whole period. 
Recovery 
rate 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
2005 - 2014 
Mean Median Std.dev. Min Max 
10% 0.795 0.779 0.803 0.824 0.737 0.696 0.703 0.695 0.669 0.653 0.722 0.765 0.226 0.166 0.999 
40% 0.798 0.782 0.806 0.829 0.742 0.702 0.710 0.703 0.678 0.663 0.728 0.771 0.221 0.199 0.999 
50% 0.799 0.783 0.807 0.832 0.745 0.705 0.713 0.707 0.682 0.668 0.731 0.774 0.219 0.202 0.999 
60% 0.801 0.785 0.809 0.835 0.747 0.707 0.715 0.710 0.685 0.672 0.734 0.783 0.220 0.166 0.999 
90% 0.811 0.796 0.822 0.862 0.783 0.744 0.758 0.760 0.742 0.744 0.774 0.808 0.198 0.202 0.999 
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Table 6. Panel regressions (random effects) of banks' systemic risk for a recovery ratio of 
50% 
The table presents the results of the panel regression (random effects) of banks’ systemic risk on the European 
banking sector. For the estimat ion of the linear panel regression model, we use heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-
White standard errors. The p-values are denoted in parentheses. */**/*** indicate coefficient significance at the 
10%/5%/1% level. Variable defin itions and sources are provided in  Appendix Table 2. 
 Systemic risk  sensitivity  Systemic risk  contribution 
Dependent variable: 
Recovery rate:  
PDbank|system 
RR: 50% 
 
PDsystem|bank 
RR: 50% 
 
Tranquil 
2005-2007 
Crisis 
2008-2013 
 
Tranquil 
2005-2007 
Crisis 
2008-2013 
Non-performing loan ratio NON_PERF -6.287 0.681  10.901* -0.527 
  (0.106) (0.388)  (0.050) (0.398) 
Tier 1 ratio TIER1  -1.020 -0.361*  1.990* 0.194 
  (0.319) (0.062)  (0.085) (0.428) 
Deposit ratio DEPOSIT -0.177 0.248**  0.115 -0.054 
  (0.539) (0.036)  (0.741) (0.738) 
Leverage ratio LEVERAGE -0.246 -0.022  0.332 -0.009 
  (0.628) (0.111)  (0.586) (0.444) 
Liquidity ratio LIQUIDITY -0.008 0.059**  -0.003 -0.024* 
  (0.632) (0.017)  (0.904) (0.093) 
Return on invested capital ROIC 1.932* 0.241  -1.726 -0.149 
  (0.090) (0.125)  (0.173) (0.249) 
Government debt DEBT 1.017*** 0.208***  -0.821** -0.367** 
  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.012) (0.013) 
Bank claims to government CLAIM -0.629* 0.306**  0.661* 0.072 
  (0.060) (0.034)  (0.078) (0.665) 
Bank credits to private CREDIT 0.106** 0.303***  -0.017 -0.087 
  (0.033) (0.001)  (0.809) (0.318) 
State aid dummy AID - -9.833***  - 6.136** 
  - (0.002)  - (0.023) 
Observations  64 196  64 196 
Groups  22 36  22 36 
R² 
 
 
within  
0.424 
within  
0.433 
 
within  
0.366 
within  
0.373 
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Figure 1. Systemic risk contribution and sensitivity  
This figure illustrates the two different contagion channels of systemic risk. Systemic risk sensitivity refers to a 
overall (macroeconomic) shock (change of a lead interest rate) that negatively affects each single financial 
institution. Systemic risk contribution refers to an individual shock in one bank (e.g. the default of an important 
borrower) that is transmitted into the whole banking system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The probability of default according to the interpretation of structural models. 
This diagram represents the probability of default (PD) in terms of the density function of a latent variable 
assumed to drive default. Default happens whenever the underlying variable (Y) falls below a cut -off point (yc). 
The probability of defau lt is given by the area on the left-hand side of the cut-off point. 
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Figure 3: Diagram representing three different dependence structures between the bank 
system’s risk and the risk of selected banks in our sample. 
This diagram illustrates the dependence between the risk of the bank system and the risk of three banks in our 
sample: Credit Agricole (Student t dependence), Bayerische Landesbank (Gumbel dependence), and HSBC 
(Clayton dependence), respectively. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1. Bank sample constituents  
The table provides the full list of banks in the sample including the names of the countries where the respective 
bank is headquartered in. 
Country Bank name 
 
 
 
AUT Erste Group AG GRE National Bank of Greece SA 
BUK KBC Group NV GRE Eurobank Ergasias SA 
BUL Dexia NV IRL Allied Irish Banks plc 
DES Danske Bank IRL Bank of Ireland  
ESP BBVA SA ITA B. Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA 
ESP Banco de Sabadell SA  ITA Banca Popolare Di Milano SC 
ESP Banco Popular Español SA ITA Banco Popolare SC 
ESP Banco Santander SA ITA Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 
ESP Bankinter SA  ITA Mediobanca SpA 
FRA  Groupe Crédit Agrico le  ITA UniCred it SpA 
FRA  Société Générale  ITA Unione Di Banche Italiane SpA  
GBR Lloyds Banking Group plc  NED ING Bank N.V. 
GBR Barclays plc NOR DNB A/S 
GBR HSBC Hold ings plc POR Banco Comercial Português SA 
GER Commerzbank AG SWE Nordea AB (publ) 
GER Deutsche AG SWE Skandinaviska Enskilda B. AB (SEB) 
GER IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG SWE Svenska Handelsbanken AB (publ) 
GRE Alpha Bank SA SWE Swedbank AB (publ) 
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Appendix Table 2. Definitions and data sources of explanatory variables  
The table provides definitions and data sources for the variables used in the panel regressions. 
 
Variable Symbol Definition Data source 
Dependent variable   
Systemic 
risk  
sensitivity 
PDbank|system 
 
For detailed definition see Section 3. PDbank|system 
measures systemic risk of banks as the probability of default of an 
individual bank conditional on a systemic crisis in the banking system. 
Own calculations with 
daily CDS data from 
S&P Capital IQ  
Systemic 
risk  
contribution 
PDsystem|bank 
 
For detailed definition see Section 3. PDsystem|bank 
measures systemic risk of the banking system as the probability of default 
of the banking system conditional on an individual negative shock for a 
bank. 
Own calculations with 
daily CDS data from 
S&P Capital IQ  
Independent variables bank characteristics  
Non-
performing 
loan ratio 
NON_PERF                    
           
 
WC01271, WC02271 
Tier 1 ratio TIER1                       
                    
 
WC18157 
Deposit 
ratio 
DEPOSIT              
                 
 
WC03019, WC03351 
Leverage 
ratio 
LEVERAGE                                                       
             
 
WC08231 
Liquidity 
ratio 
LIQUIDITY                 
        
 
WC15013 
Return on 
invested 
capital 
ROIC            –               
                                                              
                                                   
                                                                    
  
WC08376 
Independent variables macro and policy controls 
Government 
debts 
DEBT The indicator is defined (in the Maastricht Treaty) as consolidated general 
government gross debt at nominal value, outstanding at the end of the year. 
All values are scaled with the respective GDP. 
Eurostat  
tsdde410 
Bank claims 
to 
government 
BANK_CL Banks’ claims on central government as a percentage of GDP include loans 
to central government institutions net of deposits. 
World Development 
Indicators 
FS.AST.CGOV.GD.Z
S 
Bank credits 
to private 
CREDIT Financial resources provided to the private sector by depository corporations 
(deposit taking corporations except central banks), such as through loans, 
purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts 
receivable, that establish a claim for repayment (% of GDP). 
World Development 
Indicators 
FD.AST.PRVT.GD.Z
S 
State aid 
dummy 
AID Dummy variable that becomes 1 if a bank receives any advantage in any 
form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national 
public authorities. 
European 
Commission 
competition case 
database  
http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/elojade/ 
isef/index.cfm 
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Appendix Table 3. Panel data tests/diagnostics 
The table provides results of five tests for time fixed/random effects and cross sectional dependence for the panel 
regressions in Table 6. 
Test/diagnostic  Systemic risk  sensitivity 
PDbank|system_50% 
 
Systemic risk  contribution 
PDsystem|bank_50% 
Dependent variable: Tranquil 
2005-2007 
Crisis 
2008-2013 
 
Tranquil 
2005-2007 
Crisis 
2008-2013 
Random effects: 
LM-test                 Prob>chi
2
= 
Hausman-test       Prob>chi
2
= 
 
0.000 
0.690 
 
0.000 
- 
 
 
0.000 
- 
 
0.000 
0.000 
Time fixed effects   Prob>F= 0.712 0.000  0.407 0.000 
Cross sectional dependence: 
Autocorrelation: 
Heteroskedasticity: 
We use Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard error estimates to account 
for cross sectional dependence, auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity. 
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Appendix Table 4: Correlation matrix   
The table provides the correlations of the variables used in the panel regressions. Variable defin itions and  sources are provided in Appendix Table 2. As in our baseline regressions, 
PDsystem|bank and PDsystem|bank are calculated by assuming recovery rate (RR) equal to 0.50.  
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PDbank|system 1            
PDsystem|bank -0.26*** 1           
NON_PERF 0.37*** -0.38*** 1          
TIER1  -0.22*** 0.05 0.03 1         
DEPOSIT 0.25*** -0.33*** 0.34*** -0.09 1        
LEVERAGE -0.03 0.04 -0.18*** 0.08 -0.25*** 1       
LIQUIDITY -0.10 0.40*** -0.21*** 0.21*** -0.74*** 0.13**  1      
ROIC -0.26*** 0.36*** -0.49*** 0.16*** -0.10 0.14**  0.13**  1     
DEBT 0.61*** -0.22*** 0.44*** 0.02 0.27*** -0.19*** -0.11* -0.43*** 1    
CLAIM 0.39*  0.12*  0.16**  0.06 0.09 -0.08 -0.01 -0.24*** 0.71*** 1   
CREDIT 0.01 -0.10* 0.30*** 0.04 0.19*** -0.00 -0.17*** 0.02 -0.29*** -0.26*** 1  
AID -0.01 0.19*** -0.12 0.20*** -0.21*** 0.01 0.17*** -0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.20*** 1 
*/**/*** statistically significant at the 10%/5%/1% level.  
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Appendix Table 5: Panel regressions (fixed effects) of banks' systemic risk for a recovery 
ratio of 10% and 90% 
The table presents the results of the panel regression (fixed effects) of banks’ systemic risk on the European 
banking sector. For the estimat ion of the linear panel regression model, we use heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-
White standard errors. The p-values are denoted in parentheses. */**/*** indicate coefficient significance at the 
10%/5%/1% level. Variable defin itions and sources are provided in Appendix Table 2. 
Dependent variable: 
Systemic risk  sensitivity 
PDbank|system 
 
Systemic risk  contributiony 
PDsystem|bank 
Recovery rate:  RR: 10%  RR: 10% 
 
Tranquil 
2005-2007 
Crisis 
2008-2013 
 
Tranquil 
2005-2007 
Crisis 
2008-2013 
Non-performing loan ratio NON_PERF -6.205 0.683  10.853** -0.497 
  (0.112) (0.382)  (0.046) (0.417) 
Tier 1 ratio TIER1  -1.030 -0.362*  1.988* 0.179 
  (0.314) (0.061)  (0.083) (0.458) 
Deposit ratio DEPOSIT -0.181 0.244**  0.110 -0.060 
  (0.530) (0.039)  (0.750) (0.706) 
Leverage ratio LEVERAGE -0.259 -0.022  0.329 -0.008 
  (0.609) (0.119)  (0.586) (0.488) 
Liquidity ratio LIQUIDITY -0.008 0.058**  -0.002 -0.024* 
  (0.630) (0.018)  (0.906) (0.080) 
Return on invested capital ROIC 1.929* 0.238  -1.722 -0.144 
  (0.090) (0.126)  (0.172) (0.260) 
Government debt DEBT 1.010*** 0.206***  -0.816** -0.365** 
  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.012) (0.012) 
Bank claims to government CLAIM -0.631* 0.299**  0.657* 0.065 
  (0.059) (0.039)  (0.078) (0.692) 
Bank credits to private CREDIT 0.102** 0.302***  -0.022 -0.090 
  (0.038) (0.001)  (0.752) (0.297) 
State aid dummy AID - -9.725***  - 6.186** 
  - (0.002)  - (0.020) 
Observations  64 196  64 196 
Groups  22 36  22 36 
R² 
 
 
within  
0.425 
within  
0.428 
 
within  
0.365 
within  
0.381 
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Appendix Table 6: Panel regressions (fixed effects) of banks' systemic risk for a recovery 
ratio of 90% 
The table presents the results of the panel regression (fixed effects) of banks’ systemic risk on the European 
banking sector. For the estimation of the linear panel regression model, we use heteroskedasticity-robust Huber-
White standard errors. The p-values are denoted in parentheses. */**/*** indicate coefficient significance at the 
10%/5%/1% level. Variable defin itions and sources are provided in  Appendix Table 2. 
Dependent variable: 
Systemic risk  sensitivity 
PDbank|system 
 
Systemic risk  contribution 
PDsystem|bank 
Recovery rate:  RR: 90%  RR: 90% 
 
Tranquil 
2005-2007 
Crisis 
2008-2013 
 
Tranquil 
2005-2007 
Crisis 
2008-2013 
Non-performing loan ratio NON_PERF -6.609* 0.590  11.017* -0.743 
  (0.091) (0.464)  (0.065) (0.318) 
Tier 1 ratio TIER1  -0.993 -0.334*  1.998* 0.286 
  (0.331) (0.091)  (0.095) (0.296) 
Deposit ratio DEPOSIT -0.164 0.282**  0.131 0.004 
  (0.573) (0.021)  (0.713) (0.981) 
Leverage ratio LEVERAGE -0.199 -0.027*  0.346 -0.016 
  (0.695) (0.075)  (0.581) (0.238) 
Liquidity ratio LIQUIDITY -0.008 0.060**  -0.003 -0.019 
  (0.634) (0.021)  (0.890) (0.220) 
Return on invested capital ROIC 1.941* 0.239  -1.752 -0.198 
  (0.091) (0.153)  (0.179) (0.176) 
Government debt DEBT 1.038*** 0.210***  -0.839** -0.384** 
  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.015) (0.016) 
Bank claims to government CLAIM -0.620* 0.345**  0.677*  0.105 
  (0.064) (0.016)  (0.078) (0.563) 
Bank credits to private CREDIT 0.121** 0.319***  0.001 -0.066 
  (0.020) (0.000)  (0.985) (0.475) 
State aid dummy AID - -10.423***  - 5.577* 
  - (0.001)  - (0.058) 
Observations  64 196  64 196 
Groups  22 36  22 36 
R² 
 
 
within  
0.430 
within  
0.443 
 
within  
0.369 
within  
0.329 
 
 
 
